Price transmission along the food supply chain in the European Union by Bukeviciute, Lina et al.
1 
Price transmission along the food supply chain 




3 and Guillaume Roty
4 
1 European Central Bank and Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of 
the European Commission, Brussels, Belgium, e-mail: lina.bukeviciute@ec.europa.eu 
2 Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission, 
Brussels, Belgium, e-mail: adriaan.dierx@ec.europa.eu  
3 Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission, 
Brussels, Belgium, Université Libre de Bruxelles and ICHEC, e-mail: 
fabienne.ilzkovitz@ec.europa.eu 
4 Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission, 











Paper prepared for presentation at the  113
th EAAE Seminar “A resilient European food industry 






















4].  All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this 
document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright 
notice appears on all such copies. 2 
Price transmission along the food supply chain 




3 and Guillaume Roty
4 
1 European Central Bank and Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of 
the European Commission, Brussels, Belgium, e-mail: lina.bukeviciute@ec.europa.eu 
2 Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission, 
Brussels, Belgium, e-mail: adriaan.dierx@ec.europa.eu  
3 Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission, 
Brussels, Belgium, Université Libre de Bruxelles and ICHEC, e-mail: 
fabienne.ilzkovitz@ec.europa.eu 
4 Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission, 
Brussels, Belgium, e-mail: Guillaume.roty@ec.europa.eu 
Abstract. Agricultural commodities and consumer food prices have experienced strong variations over the last 2 
years, both upwards and downwards. This increased volatility, combined with long-term prospects of rising food 
prices, highlights the necessity to increase the efficiency of the food supply chain to ensure consumer food prices 
reflect the evolution of inputs prices. This paper aims at better understanding price transmission mechanisms along 
the chain across European Union Member States. Significant differences across Member States in magnitude of pass-
through of agricultural commodity prices variations to consumer prices, as well as price transmission asymmetries, 
suggest  potential  market  fragmentation  within  the  EU.  Country-specific  regulatory  frameworks,  as  well  as 
discrepancies  in  competition  intensity  and  competitive  practices  along  the  chain  can  impact  price  transmission 
significantly. In particular, differences in bargaining power between suppliers and retailers for selected food products 
have been identified as sources of cross-country discrepancies in price transmission. 
Keywords: Food, regulation, market structure, competition, pricing. 3 
1. Introduction 
In the second half of 2007 price increases of many agricultural commodities accelerated rapidly and by 
early  2008  reached  exceptional  levels.  These  increases  have  been  mainly  driven  by  a  temporary 
imbalance between demand and supply – against the background of a structural increase in demand for 
food products across the globe. The agricultural commodity price surge generated a rapid increase in 
consumer  food  prices,  which  peaked  in  July  2008.  Since  then,  agricultural  commodity  prices  have 
decreased sharply. However, structural factors like the growth in global demand and the decline in food 
crop productivity growth are likely to hold up these prices in the medium term.  
This  paper  aims  to  better  understand  how  the  degree  of  competition  in  the  food  industry  and  the 
downstream retail markets may have affected price developments and to identify regulatory practices that 
may  help  to  lessen  the  impact  on  consumers  of  price  volatility  on  agricultural  commodity  markets. 
Improving  the  functioning  of  the  food  supply  is  particularly  important  in  the  present  economic 
circumstances. In order to sustain the purchasing power of European households it is essential that the 
downward  price  movements  in  commodity  markets  are  transmitted  without  delay  to  consumers. 
Households devote, on average, one sixth of their expenditures to food and beverages. This share is even 
higher for low income households.  
This investigation into the functioning of the food supply chain is the first in-depth market monitoring 
exercise organised as a follow-up to the November 2007 Single Market Review
1. Such market monitoring 
exercises  aim  to  analyse  the  functioning  of  markets  and  sectors  along  different  dimensions,  such  as 
regulation, integration, competition and innovation. By investigating the dynamic interactions between 
market structure, firms' conduct and economic performance the in-depth monitoring of the food supply 
chain permits the derivation of more evidence based policy recommendations.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the food supply chain. The focus of 
analysis is on the food processing industry and the distribution sector. Section 3 makes an analysis of the 
food price transmission mechanism, looking in particular at the pass-through of price developments along 
the food supply chain. The structure of the different markets along the food supply chain is discussed in 
section 4 while section 5 analyses the impact of regulation and business practices on the functioning of 
this chain. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Description of the food supply chain 
The food supply chain is composed of a wide diversity of products and companies which operate in 
different markets and sell a variety of food products. The regulatory framework affects the food supply 
chain at all levels from the agricultural sector down to the retail sector. The degree of market power held 
by the firms along the chain varies by product category, depending on the relevant markets in which these 
firms operate. It has an impact on the contractual relationships between the main players along the chain 
and can influence the degree of transmission of the increase in agricultural commodity prices to consumer 
prices. Given this complexity, general conclusions regarding the functioning of the food supply chain 
have to be drawn with caution. Therefore, this analysis will not necessarily come up with concrete policy 
recommendations but will rather identify a number of issues that merit further investigation. This better 
understanding of the functioning of the food supply chain will also contribute to a more informed debate 
on policy proposals with stakeholders.  
The  food  supply  chain  connects  three  main  sectors  (see  Figure  1):  the  agricultural  sector,  the  food 
processing industry and the distribution sectors (wholesale and retail). Basic agricultural commodities 
undergo, to varying degrees, an often substantial series of intermediate alterations before they are sold as 
final food products to consumers. A description of the food supply chain may improve the understanding 
of how prices are formed along this chain, how input costs are passed on, where interactions between 
firms take place and where different regulations may have an impact. However, since specific food supply 
chains exist for every single food item purchased by consumers, the following description is a necessary 
simplification.  
                                                            
1  The European Commission
[1] provides recent information on the use of the market monitoring tool. 4 
The first sector considered in the food supply chain is the agricultural sector. Its activities include crop 
production and the raising of livestock. As agricultural commodities comprise of very different products, 
the sector's distribution channels are equally diverse. Firms in the agricultural sector primarily sell their 
output to the food processing industry and to itself (e.g. animal feed), but also sell directly to retailers, 
final consumers or alternative markets (e.g. biofuels). The food processing industry is very heterogeneous 
and  comprises  of  a  number  of  varied  activities.  These  include  for  example  refining  (sugar),  milling 
(cereals),  cleaning,  cutting  or  drying  (fruit  and  vegetables)  and  slaughtering  and  disassembling 
(livestock). The different inputs are processed in successive stages and to different degrees, packaged and 
dispatched to customers (e.g. distributors, food service). Another important activity of food manufacturers 
is to carry out market and product research leading to the development of new products, and to engage in 
marketing. The distribution sector (and retail in particular) is the principal outlet for food products and, 
being the final link in the supply chain, it interacts directly with final consumers. While the sector's main 
activity is the sale of products, in doing so, retailers may also carry out services for food manufacturers, 














































































Figure 1. Schematic representation of the food supply chain 
The  transfer  of  intermediate  goods  can  be  directly  between  firms  involved  in  production  or  sale  to 
consumers or, as is often the case, via specific wholesalers. Such transfers can be analysed from both a 
contractual  and  a  technical  perspective.  The  contractual  aspects  essentially  refer  to  buyer-seller 
interactions and are influenced by the relative market power of the firms along the chain. On the technical 
side, the transfer involves a series of activities which generate additional costs, such as those incurred for 
transport, storage and logistics. Therefore, besides the raw material – which in general accounts for only a 
small share of total costs – the cost structure of food production comprises of a number of other cost 
factors, most notably transport energy and labour, which are reflected in the final consumer prices. In 
addition, the functioning of the food supply chain is also affected by a number of external factors such as 5 
regulation, public policy and the macroeconomic environment, which impact cost structures and price 
developments across Member States.  
3. Determinants of consumer food price developments in the EU 
3.1. Recent developments in food prices 
In the second half of 2007, price increases of many agricultural commodities accelerated rapidly and 
reached exceptional levels by the end of the year. The agricultural commodity price surge generated a 
rapid increase in producer and consumer food prices within the EU (see Figure 2). 
Member States have reacted very differently to the strong increase in agricultural commodity prices. In 
particular, the largest food price increases have occurred in the new Member States. In Bulgaria, Latvia 
and Lithuania price levels increased by more than 15% between July 2007 and August 2008. Among the 
old Member States, consumer prices rose by more than 6% over this period in Austria, Denmark, Ireland 
and the UK. 
The relatively large increases in price levels in the new Member States may be explained not only by the 
generally higher levels of wage and price inflation in these countries, but also by the fact that agricultural 
commodities take up a greater share of the production costs of food items. Consumer food prices in new 
Member States could therefore be expected to be more sensitive to increases in the prices of agricultural 
commodities. Moreover, the weight of food in household consumption baskets is typically higher in new 
Member State and therefore, the contribution of food inflation to overall inflation is also higher in these 
countries.  Prices  and  price  changes  may  also  be  affected  by  the  functioning  of  downstream  market 
conditions in these countries. Currency appreciation, on the contrary, appears to have had a dampening 
effect on food price inflation in countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.  
After having reached its peak in May-June 2008, consumer food price inflation has been on a decreasing 
trend in all Member States with the exception of Slovenia. This decrease in consumer price inflation 
followed the declines in producer and agricultural price inflation. Differences between Member States in 
terms of the transmission of downwards price movements can also be observed. While in some countries 
consumer  food  prices  appear  to  have  adjusted  downward  rather  quickly  following  the  decline  in 
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Source: Own calculations based on ESTAT. 
 
Figure 2. Consumer, producer and raw material food price increases in the EU 
 over the period 2002:1-2008:8 (y-o-y growth rates) 6 
3.2. Production costs and producer prices in the food processing industry 
This section aims to assess  whether the observed changes in producer prices, i.e. the prices that the 
industry charges to wholesalers and retailers, reflect changes in the production costs in the food and 
beverages industry. As no direct information on production costs is available, price changes of the main 
inputs  categories  (i.e.  compensation  of  employees,  agricultural  inputs,  energy  and  transport,  inputs 
coming from food processing industry itself, as well as other intermediary products) are summarised 
using  input-output  tables  in  a  weighted  cost  index  for  the  food  and  beverage  industry  of  individual 
Member States. The changes in this calculated cost index are then compared to the observed changes in 
the producer price index for the food and beverage industry. 
Figure 3 compares the evolution of changes in the calculated cost index with changes in the observed 
producer price index over the period 2005-2008 in the larger EU Member States. In all countries, the rise 
in input costs was relatively moderate early on but rose to higher levels later within this period before 
slowing down most recently, suggesting that the order of magnitude of observed price changes is to a 
large extent justified by changes in the underlying input costs. However, there seem to be differences 
between countries, which are more apparent in the recent period. While in the UK and, to a lesser extent, 
in the case of France and Poland, changes in producers prices seem to track changes in input prices, albeit 
with a small time lag, in the other large EU Member States, such as Germany, Italy and Spain, this seems 
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Figure 3. Comparison between changes in the food and beverages producer price index 
 and the production cost index 
3.3. The pass-through along the food supply chain 
This section aims to assess whether there are differences regarding the magnitude, speed and nature of the 
pass  through  of  agricultural  commodity  prices  into  producer  and  consumer  prices  (see  Box  1  for  a 
definition of these concepts) along the food supply chain.  7 
Box 1. Magnitude, speed and nature of pass through 
Price transmission along the food chain has attracted considerable interest in the economic literature. During recent 
years the number of studies on the subject has grown rapidly. However, given the recent changes in the structure of 
food markets and evolving business practices, new questions are still emerging. 
Vertical price transmission may be characterised by the magnitude, speed and nature (downwards or upwards) of the 
price pass-through between different segments of the supply chain. The magnitude of the pass-through measures how 
much of the initial price change is reflected in the changes in consumer prices observed. The shorter the lag with 
which consumer prices follow commodity and producer prices, respectively, the higher the speed of pass-through. 
Finally, if the speed and the magnitude of the pass-trough differ depending on whether there is a price decrease or 
increase, price transmission is considered to be asymmetric. In order to raise their profit margins, actors along the 
food supply chain would have an interest in passing on price increases more rapidly than price decreases. As a result 
the measured pass-through would be higher in the case of price increases than in the case of price decreases.  
The magnitude of the pass-through has typically been the focus of attention in the economic literature investigating 
the price transmission along the food supply chain. In more recent work, the issue of asymmetric price transmission 
has  attracted  an  increasing  interest  (see  Vavra  and  Goodwin
[2]).  The  magnitude,  the  speed  and  the  degree  of 
asymmetry  in  the  pass-through  are  influenced,  among  others,  by  cost  structures  and  market  conditions  (see 
Zachariasse and Bunte
[3] and Azzam
[4]). In particular, Röller et al.
[5] suggest a link between pass-through and the 
degree of market power held by firms, making reference to the finding by Feenstra et al.
[6] of a U-shaped relationship 
between market share and magnitude of the pass-through.  
3.3.1  The pass-through from agricultural commodity prices to producer prices 
This section investigates the extent to which agricultural price increases have been passed through to 
producer prices. This analysis is based on a simple OLS regression. The estimated elasticity of producer 
prices  to  agricultural  commodity  prices  ranges  between  1%  for  Portugal  and  22%  for  Poland.  This 
suggests that agricultural commodity price increases/decreases tend to be transmitted to producer prices at 
a  rate  that  varies  across  countries.  The  low  rate  of  pass-through  in  Portugal  could  indicate  that  the 
increases/decreases in agricultural commodity prices tend to be absorbed by the food producer sector 
through a reduction of profit margins, whereas the opposite might be true in the case of Poland. However, 
the relatively high rate of pass-through in Poland could also be explained by macroeconomic factors (see 
Section 3.1). Nevertheless, this analysis provides a first indication that upstream factors can help explain 
why consumer food prices in different EU Member States have reacted very differently to the agricultural 
price shocks encountered in 2007 and 2008.  
3.3.2  The pass-through from producer to consumer prices 
This  section  considers  the  transmission  from  producer  to  consumer  prices.  In  most  of  the  euro  area 
countries producer food prices started to rise faster than consumer food prices from mid 2007 onwards, 
whereas the opposite had been true in the period from 2002 to mid-2007. This could suggest that the more 
recent producer price increases were not fully transmitted to consumer food prices and that they were 
partially absorbed by the food retail sector through a reduction of profit margins. This hypothesis is 
confirmed by preliminary data for 2007 showing a decrease in profit margins in the euro area retail sector. 
In most of the new Member States, on the contrary, the increase in consumer food prices over the period 
July 2007 – July 2008 exceeded the producer price increases observed during that same period, which 
could be indicative of increased margins in food retailing.  
A further investigation of the link between consumer and producer food prices reveals differences in 
terms of the magnitude and speed of the pass-through across the EU countries. Two methods have been 
used to investigate this link: an error correction model (see Box 2) and a simple OLS regression. Both 
methods give converging results, as shown by Figure 4. 
Box 2. The error correction model 
The empirical analysis is conducted in three main steps: 
-  First, the non-stationarity of all price series was examined using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF). It was 
found that all the series in logarithm were non-stationary. 
-  Second, the existence of a cointegration relationship between consumer food prices and producer prices was 
established by applying the standard Engel-Granger two-step procedure.  8 
-  Finally, the model containing an error correction mechanism was estimated for two groups of countries, namely 
the new EU Member States and the euro area countries. In addition, this model was estimated separately for 
Denmark, Romania, Sweden and the UK, due to the heterogeneity of theses countries compared to the countries 
in  the  two  above  mentioned  groups.  We  consider  Romania  separately,  as  the  observed  percentage  point 
difference between inflation of consumer and producer prices was negative in Romania, whereas it was positive 
in the other new EU Member States. Moreover, consumer food price increases were lower in Romania compared 
to the other new EU member States. Denmark, Sweden and the UK are not euro area countries and they have 
experienced on average higher consumer food price increases than the euro area. Thus, the model was estimated 
separately for these countries. 
The  key  feature  of  the  chosen  error  correction  model  is  that  it  postulates  an  underlying  long-run  equilibrium 
relationship between the food producer and consumer prices. This long-run equilibrium corresponds to a situation 
whereby consumer prices will remain unchanged if there is no change in producer prices. 
The estimated error correction model is specified as: 
  
where ft denotes the monthly index (log) of the consumer food prices; pt is the monthly index of producer food prices, 
and εt is an error term.  
In this equation, the variation in consumer food prices depends on their past rates of variation, the past rates of 
producer price variations as well as deviations from the long-run equilibrium. The coefficients β and φ measure the 
short-run pass-through (i.e. the impact of consumer and producer prices respectively). The term (ft-1 - θpt-1) represents 
the long-run equilibrium relationship between consumer and producer prices. 
The coefficient θ is the long-run elasticity of food consumer prices to food producer prices (i.e. how much the change 
in the producer price is passed on to the final consumer). For example a value of 0.6 for θ means that 60% of the 
producer price change is passed on to the final consumer or in other words that a 10% increase in producer prices 
eventually leads to a 6% rise in the consumer prices. The coefficient δ is the long-run adjustment parameter and 
represents the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. It shows how rapidly consumer food prices approach 
the long-run equilibrium after a deviation from this equilibrium. For example, a value of 0.1 implies that the deviation 
from the long-run equilibrium is reduced by 10% per month. 
Finally, the robustness of the results obtained with the error correction model is tested by comparing these results 
with those obtained with simple OLS regressions carried out for individual countries. In these equations, consumer 
food price variations are regressed against lagged values of the dependent variables (and seasonal dummies) and of 
the producer food prices: 
 
where ∆ft corresponds to the monthly growth rates of the consumer food prices, ∆pt are the annual growth rates of the 
producer food prices, and εt is an error term. 
 
Figure  4  shows  the  estimated  elasticities  of  consumer  prices  to  producer  prices  resulting  from  the 
application  of  the  error  correction  model  and  the  simple  OLS  regression,  respectively.  The  results 
obtained with the error correction model reveal that the estimated long-run elasticity ranges between 10% 
and 30% for the group of countries examined. The lowest long-run elasticity is found for Romania and 
the euro area and the highest for the new Member States and Sweden. The estimates obtained by the OLS 
method confirm these results. This suggests that changes in consumer prices resulting from movements in 
producer prices vary across countries. The low pass-through in Romania and the euro area is an indication 
that the observed changes in producer prices are absorbed to some extent by a reduction in profit margins 
in the food retail sector. On the contrary, the high rate of pass-through in the new Member States and 
Sweden is a sign that changes in producer prices are rather more fully transmitted to consumer prices.  
Finally, the magnitude of the pass-through from producer to consumer prices appears to be higher than 
the pass through from agricultural commodity prices to producer prices. A possible explanation for this 
observation  could  be  that  agricultural  commodities  represent  only  a  small  share  of  the  total  food 
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Figure 4. Elasticity of consumer food prices to producer food prices 
Turning  to  the  speed  of  adjustment,  estimations  indicate  that,  on  average,  the  deviation  from  the 
equilibrium level is reduced by 21% per month for consumer prices in the euro area. Prices appear to 
adjust somewhat faster in the new Member States, with an average reduction of 27% per month. Even 
more  rapid  adjustment  is  estimated  for  the  UK  and  Sweden.  These  results  show  that  the  speed  of 
adjustment also varies across countries.  
However, several caveats should be kept in mind when comparing the size and the speed of the pass-
through in the new Member States and in the euro area. There are a number of factors which may explain 
higher pass-through in the new Member States compared to old Member States. First, in the new Member 
States with the lowest price levels, the contribution of (unprocessed) food to the (final) retail price tends 
to be greater. Second, increases in indirect taxes during the period under investigation contributed to the 
relatively higher consumer food price increases in most of the new Member States. Third, energy price 
increases were stronger in most new Member states. Fourth, price arbitrage within the EU may have taken 
place and exerted upward pressures on food prices in the Member States with the lowest price levels. 
Finally, the increases in food prices may simply reflect the catching up process in the new Member States 
with the remainder of the European Union. Such a process may be reflected in changes in the retail 
market structure and increases in wage levels. Issues related to changes in market structure are analysed 
in more detail in Section 4.  
3.3.3  The asymmetry in the transmission of producer prices to consumer prices 
For the euro area, the magnitude of the transmission is similar in the case of a price increase and a price 
decrease. Moreover, price decreases are transmitted quite rapidly. Thus, the results seem to indicate that 
downward price stickiness is not an issue in the euro area. In the new Member States, on the other hand, 
there appears to be some evidence of downward price stickiness, as the magnitude of the pass-through of 
producer prices to consumer prices is larger when prices go up. The observed elasticity in case of price 
increases is even larger than one, which would seem to suggest that margins increase in this case. On the 
other hand, when producer prices decrease, the estimated elasticity is less than one and there are lags (see 
Box 3). This would lead one to conclude that there is an asymmetry in the transmission of producer to 
consumer prices in the new Member States. While it is difficult to generalise and these results should be 
interpreted  with care, they suggest that the retail  markets in  the euro area are relatively competitive 
whereas this seems to be less the case for new Member States.  
Box 3. The analysis of the asymmetric price transmission from producer to consumer food prices 
The analysis of the asymmetric price transmission from producer to consumer food prices is based on the following 
simple OLS regression: 





















where  CP is a change of the consumer food prices,  Pt is a change of the producer prices
2 and ε is an error term. 
The reaction of the consumer prices is symmetric to increases and decreases in P if  β = β
+ - β
- ≈ 0. 
The estimates of β (and hence of  β) may be biased if the entire reaction of consumer food prices to changes in 
producer prices is delayed. In order to account for this possibility a regression with three lags is estimated: 






















For i=1,2, .., 6. 
According to the Wald test, the difference between the coefficients β
+=1.08 (instant reaction) and β
-=0.85 (3 lags) is 
significant at 1% test level in the case of the new Member States. Thus, the results show that the magnitude of the 
pass-through of producer prices to consumer prices is relatively large in most of the new Member States when prices 
go up. In fact, in this case, the elasticity is larger than one suggesting that margins increase. Interestingly, when 
producer prices decrease, the estimated elasticity is less than one and there are lags. In the euro area, on the contrary, 
the combination of the coefficients β
+=0.48 (1 lag) and β
+=0.47 (3 lags) does not differ significantly from the β
-=0.95 
(instant reaction). This is an indication that within the euro area the transmission mechanism of producer prices to 
consumer prices is symmetric. 












Coefficient 0,85** 1,08*** 0,53 0,50
Std. Error 0,42 0,18
t-Statistic 2,04 5,99
(***) - indicates significance at 1% test level.
(**) - indicates significance at 5% test level.
(*) - indicates significance at 10% test level.
Consumer food prices increases
2005 January - 2008 August
 
 















Coefficient 0,95*** 0,48*** 0,47*** 0,40 0,36
Std. Error 0,29 0,18 0,18
t-Statistic 3,31 2,65 2,59
(***) - indicates significance at 1% test level.
(**) - indicates significance at 5% test level.
(*) - indicates significance at 10% test level.
Consumer food prices increases
2005 January - 2008 August
 
 
                                                            
2   Given that we observe very few  Pt with negative value, we define  Pt as second order differences 
or  Pt  =  Pt-1 –  Pt.  11 
4. The structure of markets along the food supply chain 
4.1. Fragmentation of the food supply chain 
As shown in the previous section, the shock caused by the recent upsurge in agricultural commodity 
prices has been absorbed differently across Member States. In particular, the analysis has shown that the 
food price increases have been stronger in most of the new Member States than in euro area countries. 
While some of these differences in national consumer food price increases can be explained by macro-
economic factors or differences in cost structures, they are also an indication that the EU single market in 
food remains fragmented.  
This conclusion is supported by other evidence as well. The import penetration rate in the food and 
beverage industry (0.28) is well below the EU average for manufacturing (0.63). Moreover, the share of 
cross-border M&A deals in the total number of deals (0.25) is lower than the average for manufacturing 
industries (0.29). This indicates that there are still barriers to trade and cross-border investment in this 
sector, particularly for SMEs. The relatively high degree of dispersion  between food prices in different 
EU Member States is another indication of the fragmentation of food markets, which may be explained on 
the one hand by the diversity in national preferences of European consumers and on the other hand by 
cross-country differences in the regulatory environment and the behaviour of food processors. 
For wholesale and retail trade, the only available indicator of market integration is the share of cross-
border mergers. This indicator is below the EU average of services for the retail trade but not for the 
wholesale trade. Different factors may help explain the relatively low amount of cross-border investment 
in retail trade. For example, the high market share of large retailers in some countries makes market entry 
more risky and reduces the expected return of foreign investment because the national market is already 
saturated. 
4.2. Concentration and consolidation along the food supply chain 
Consolidation  is  taking  place  throughout  the  food  supply  chain.  The  retail  sector  in  particular  is 
characterised by an increased presence of large food retailers. Within a larger and increasingly integrated 
European Single Market, consolidation can lead to efficiency gains and put a downward pressure on 
prices. However, a vigilant competition policy is required to ensure that the beneficial effects of this 
consolidation process are not outweighed by potentially negative side effects (such as anti-competitive 
agreements or abuses of dominant positions) which might impede effective competition. 
In the food processing sectors, concentration levels vary strongly across food categories and by extension 
food sub-industries. Palpacuer and Tozanli
[7] show that in sectors such as biscuits and confectionery, the 
concentration ratio is above 60%. In general, the firms that are active in these most concentrated food 
categories operate at global level and typically offer internationally branded products. A strong brand may 
serve as a signal of quality, thus helping to secure consumer loyalty. At the same time it may make it 
harder for potential rivals to compete, dissuading them from entering the market and making it difficult 
for retailers not to carry the product (the so-called 'must-stock' products). Food products that are less 
differentiated such as bread, meat or flour are typically produced by food sub-industries that are less 
concentrated, including craft production (e.g. bakeries, butcheries). The incidence of private label and no-
label  products  is  more  widespread  in  the  latter  categories.  However,  the  geographic  scope  of  these 
products is also likely to be narrower. 
The EU food retail sector is characterised by a high degree of concentration: in most Member States the 
five largest retailer chains account for over 50% of the market. Concentration levels are higher in the old 
Member States. 
A process of consolidation in the food retail sector is on-going across the European territory, but the 
consolidation movement is particularly strong in the new Member States. In these countries consolidation 
has gone hand in hand with an increase in food retail surface area, which can be explained both by a 
larger number of individual stores and an increase in average store size. The increase in the number of 
outlets  appears  to  have  offset  to  some  extent  the  increase  in  food  prices  associated  with  surge  in 
agricultural commodity prices. 12 
In many of the old Member States, the consolidation movement has been accompanied by a switch from 
smaller to larger store formats (i.e. hypermarkets, supermarkets and discounters) as well as an overall 
reduction in the number of stores. With the exception of Sweden, the total food retail surface area has 
increased  in  all  countries.  Even  though  higher  concentration  levels  may  prima  facie  suggest  weaker 
competition  and  therefore  may  lead  to  higher  prices,  the  larger  store  formats  may  lead  to  increased 
economies of scale and scope resulting in lower prices. Nevertheless, the presence of more than one retail 
store in a catchment area is crucial for competition to occur. 
Another trend which may contain retail prices is the increase in the market share of discounters, who 
typically focus on low prices at the expense of other product dimensions (see Figure 5). The presence of 
discounters exerts pressure on other retailers to increasingly focus on the price dimension and affects the 
profitability of other retail formats (see Cleeren et al.
[8]). Their growing presence may also have been 
spurred on by changing household purchasing habits and a higher price sensitivity. Over the period 2002-
2007, the share of discounters increased in almost all EU Member States and in particular in some of the 
new  Member  States  (Slovakia,  Romania  and  the  Baltic  States).  With  a  market  share  of  over  30%, 
discounters  are  by  far  most  successful  in  Germany  and  Austria,  where  they  have  a  long-established 
presence. In the new Member States, discounters are particularly strong in Poland, Hungary and the Baltic 
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Note:   Market share calculated as the share of discounters' turnover in turnover of large retailers 
(hypermarkets, supermarkets and discounters).   
Source:   Euromonitor International   
Figure 5. Combined market share of retail discounters, 2002 and 2007 
4.3. Bargaining power along the food supply chain 
The degree of bargaining power held by the firms in vertically-related markets varies by product category 
and can potentially lead to imbalances in the food supply chain. It is influenced inter alia by the position 
of firms in the markets in which they operate, be it as suppliers or as buyers. For example, in the case of 
biscuits and confectionery, retailers seem to be in a much weaker bargaining position than in the case of 
dairy products where the upstream food producers are more fragmented as seen in Table 4. Consolidation 
in a sector may allow firms to thwart market or buyer power in a vertically-related market, but may also 
result in foreclosure. 
In particular, the fact that many large retailers increasingly operate in more than one Member State and 
thus have access to a wider potential consumer base strengthens their position. A potential upstream 
consequence of consolidation at the retail level is that suppliers are limited in the number of alternative 
outlets.  Analogously,  when  concentration  occurs  in  the  food  industry,  retailers  themselves  face  a 13 
reduction  of  alternative  sources  of  supply.  Ultimately,  excessive  concentration  may  result  in  anti-
competitive developments leading to price increases. For this reason the developments in the sectors 
along the food supply chain and the behaviour of market participants need to be monitored closely to pre-
empt anti-competitive situations that would fuel price increases.  
A number of features other than the market share of firms involved in a vertical transaction may affect 
their bargaining power or already be a reflection of it. These features include product attributes, for 
example the relative importance of branded products, as well as contractual terms between vertically-
related firms. These features are by and large legitimate activities, but deserve consideration in any deeper 
assessment of the food supply chain. Some of these practices are discussed in the next section.  
Another trend that may affect the relationships between food producers and retailers is the growth in the 
share of private label products introduced by food retailers. The market share of such products varies by 
country, product-category and store format. In some Member States they now account for more than 40% 
of products sold (see Table 3) and for many store formats, in particular discounters, they represent the 
quasi-totality of listed products.  
Table 3. Share of retailer brands (all products) by EU Member State, 2008 
AT BE BG CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE GR HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PO RO SK SL ES SE UK
22% 42% n.a. n.a. 27% 27% n.a. 25% 32% 40% n.a. 25% n.a. 16% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 23% 21% 31% n.a. 33% n.a. 34% 27% 43% 
Source: Private label manufacturers association http://www.plmainternational.com/en/private_label_en2.htm 
While private labels widen the range of available products and thus represent an additional source of 
competition,  they  may  lead  to  foreclosure  effects  as  supplier  of  branded  products  become  a  direct 
competitor to the retailer (Dobson and Waterson
[9]). Similarly, although they provide opportunities for 
their producers to have access to a large customer base, they may also reinforce their dependency on a 
particular retailer. Given the different motivations for introducing own brands, it is difficult to predict 
their long-term impact on prices. However, recent evidence tends to show that they exert a downward 
influence on the price level of a given product category. For example, a recent market analysis by Planet 
Retail
[10] comparing the prices of branded products and corresponding retailer brands finds that the latter 
are generally  lower priced: in  most cases analysed  more than 30%.  Analysing the impact of retailer 
brands in 35 product categories (30 of which are food products) on the basis of consumer household panel 
data for Sweden, Anselmsson et al.
[11] find that the market share of retailer brands exerts a negative effect 
on  the  average  price  levels  in  the  respective  categories.  This  downward  price  impact  is  strongest 
immediately following the introduction of these products. 
The increased bargaining power of retailers resulting from the introduction of private label products may 
be offset by the strong bargaining power of firms offering (internationally) branded products due to the 
'must-have' status of such products. Producers of homogeneous products, for which brand awareness is 
not  high,  are  likely  to  be  in  a  much  weaker  position.  A  stronger  brand  image  results  from  product 
differentiation  through  investment  in  product  innovation,  quality  and  advertising.  Ultimately  strong 
brands may constitute entry barriers, as new entrants would be faced with high levels of upfront costs 
they could not recover subsequently (endogenous sunk costs). 
Advertising expenditure can be viewed both as a proxy for market entry barriers (i.e. an endogenous sunk 
cost) and a relative bargaining strength. Advertising by food producers help create a strong brand image, 
send signals of quality, differentiate the good from others and thus secure consumer loyalty. However, as 
indicated in the previous section, a strong brand image may also make it harder to compete against the 
concerned product. 
5. The impact of regulations and business practices 
 
5.1. Regulatory issues 
The regulatory framework affects the food supply chain at all levels from the agricultural sector down to 
retail. Regulation may affect the functioning of markets through industry/sector-specific regulation (e.g. 
urban planning regulations and opening hours in the case of the retail sector) or economy-wide provisions 
(e.g. labour market regulation, or competition policy). The regulatory framework can raise compliance 14 
costs for firms, which will be passed on to customers in the form of higher prices. Regulation can also 
directly affect prices through price regulation. Another aspect that needs to be taken into account is the 
level  at  which  the  regulatory  framework  is  designed,  decided  and  enforced  (i.e.  EU-wide,  national, 
regional, local). To the extent that the applicable regulatory framework varies across countries (and even 
regions), the regulatory impact across the EU is consequently likely to differ as well and may explain 
price differentials to some extent. 
While an analysis of regulation should take into consideration the costs imposed on firms and ultimately 
passed on to consumer prices, it should also take account of the regulatory benefits and the contribution 
of  regulation  to  overall  social  well-being.  For  example,  planning  restrictions  are  often  identified  as 
competition-inhibiting regulations that raise entry barriers for potential entrants and protect incumbents. 
At the same time they may be devised to address congestion issues, noise pollution or considerations 
about the image of town-centres. Therefore, an in-depth examination of the impact of the regulatory 
framework on the functioning of the food supply chain needs to fully take into account the different 
objectives  of  regulations  that  are  imposed  on  firms  and  whether  those  objectives  are  met  in  a 
proportionate way and in a manner consistent with other general policy objectives. 
Three  types  of  regulation  affecting  in  particular  the  retail  sector  have  been  identified  as  potentially 
problematic for the functioning of the food supply chain: regulations creating entry barriers, regulations 
limiting  price  competition  and  regulations  restricting  shop  opening  hours.  The  McKinsey  Global 
Institute
[12] makes the argument that such regulations can explain a large share of the productivity growth 
gap between EU Member States and the US. The OECD regulatory indicators for the retail sector reveal 
that price controls and operational restrictions on retail trade (including restrictions on shop opening 
hours) are more common in many EU Member States than in the US, while this is less the case for entry 
barriers (see Conway and Nicoletti
[13]). In total, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Luxembourg, 
Poland and Portugal seem to be more regulated than other EU Member States. . 
Schivardi and Viviano
[14] show that entry barriers exert a strong influence on incumbents' performance in 
Italian retail trade, increasing profit margins and prices and reducing productivity and ICT investments. 
Haskel and Sadun
[15] find a similar result for the UK and suggest that the planning regulation reduced 
retailing productivity growth between 1998 and 2003. Griffith and Harmgart
[16] also demonstrate that 
planning regulations represent an entry barrier in the UK, reducing the number of large supermarkets and 
leading to a welfare loss for consumers. However, they also indicate that this cost could be offset against 
any benefits which may result from reduced congestion. Finally, Bertrand and Kramaz
[17] find that the 
zoning regulation introduced in France in the early 1970s to restrain the development of large retail stores 
has  had a negative impact on employment.  A  similar result is obtained for Italy by  Viviano
[18]  who 
compares retail trade employment growth in regions with more or less restrictive entry regulations. 
General regulations on commercial establishments, or land and urban planning regulations affecting the 
attribution of construction permits, which limit the establishment of new stores, can thus create entry 
barriers with a negative impact on the performance of the retail trade. An informal survey carried out by 
the  European  Commission  in  2008  amongst  national  competition  authorities  suggests  that  planning 
regimes place more limited constraints on the extension of existing stores by retailers compared with new 
entry. This gives a greater incentive to incumbent retailers to expand and thus make it less attractive for 
rival  retailers  to  open  up  competing  outlets.  In  general,  these  urban  planning  regulations  foresee 
authorisation procedures for shops above a certain size. The procedure can be based on a number of 
criteria  (amongst  them  criteria  of  an  economic  nature,  such  as  the  impact  of  the  establishment  on 
competitors or on the “balance” between different forms of shop formats) which give a very large margin 
of discretion to the authorities delivering the authorisation. The procedure itself does not necessarily 
guarantee an objective or impartial application of the relevant criteria.  
Below  cost  selling  restrictions  and  associated  regulations  fixing  invoice  price  levels  belong  to  this 
category of regulations limiting price competition. In many Member States restrictions on below costs 
selling are in place and aim to establish a certain threshold price under which operators are not allowed to 
sell except in a limited set of circumstances. However, the coverage of the prohibition of below cost 
selling varies widely across Member States (e.g. application of the prohibition to all retail sectors or only 
to certain firms or products; circumstances under which below cost selling would be allowed even if the 
practice is generally prohibited; elements included in the calculation of "costs", etc.). 
Below-cost selling restrictions set a price floor limiting intra-brand price competition between retailers. 
As  the  price  floor  is  often  defined  as  the  invoice  price,  such  restrictions  amount  to  resale  price 15 
maintenance.  Furthermore,  they  lead  to  higher  stock-management  costs  as  retailers  may  face  more 
difficulties  in  selling  excessive  stocks.  These  costs  are  likely  to  be  higher  for  perishable  products. 
Regulation defining how this price floor ought to be calculated can also exacerbate price stickiness. In 
market segments where food suppliers have considerable market power, these restrictions can lead to the 
establishment of relatively high price floors. Analysing the effects of below-cost pricing prohibitions, 
Collins et al.
[19] and Biscourp et al.
[20] find evidence of a reduction in intra-brand competition and an 
increase in grocery prices following its introduction. 
Various regulations restricting the operational conduct of retail trade, including in particular restrictions 
on shop opening hours, are in place all across Europe and often even vary even within Member States. 
These regulations seem to be generally more restrictive in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Poland and Spain. They may also have a potential negative impact on competition 
but  to  a  lesser  extent  than  planning  regulations,  according  to  the  survey  made  amongst  national 
competition authorities. Such regulations may also reduce retailers' efficiency by limiting the possibility 
of selling their products, and thereby increasing operational, logistics and wastage costs of retail outlets. 
However, the efficiency considerations of lessening restrictions, such as those on shop opening hours, 
should be seen in the light of the potential social impact, notably on smaller shops and shop-keepers.  
5.2. Business practices 
The functioning of the food supply chain is affected by the degree of competition at all stages of the 
chain. In particular, a higher degree of competition is associated with lower mark-ups, greater efficiency 
and therefore better performances in terms of innovation, quality, and prices. The degree of competition 
along the food supply chain may be affected by a number of business practices. While such practices 
could  give  rise  to  competition  concerns,  it  should  be  emphasised  that  very  few  practices  can  be 
considered anti-competitive per se. Cartels are the exception. Therefore, the business practices described 
below have to be examined on a case-by-case basis, always considering the context in which they take 
place. The consequences of interactions between firms are situation-specific and consequently need to be 
assessed in terms of their effect on competition as well as from an efficiency perspective – i.e. in terms of 
innovative performance, economies of scale and economies of scope.  
Cartels are hard-core restrictions of competition. Recent experience shows that cartels can occur in the 
food sector. These cartels tend to vary in terms of territorial scope. Special attention should be given by 
competition authorities to uncovering the most harmful cartels amongst suppliers of both processed and 
non-processed foods. 
The size and number of "buying alliances" in the food sector have grown considerably throughout the 
EU. The involvement of larger buyers in such alliances has led to increasing concerns expressed by food 
producers. These  joint  purchasing  agreements  can  be  used  as  a  tool  for  obstructing  rivals'  access  to 
essential inputs at competitive conditions and/or for competitors to engage in collusive behaviour on 
downstream markets. However, these purchasing agreements are often concluded by small and medium-
sized retailers and  wholesalers to achieve volumes and discounts similar to their bigger competitors. 
These agreements between SMEs are therefore normally pro-competitive since even if a moderate degree 
of market power is created, this is likely to be outweighed by efficiency gains resulting from economies 
of scale. 
Practices relating to resale price maintenance restrict the buyer's (i.e. the wholesaler or retailer's) ability 
to determine the price level at which the products are sold to customers. As a result, price competition in 
the  downstream  market  is  significantly  reduced.  Practices  relating  to  resale  price  maintenance  often 
appear local in scope and National Competition Authorities are well equipped to address them. 
Other vertical agreements such as single branding obligations, which require retailers to sell a single 
product, and certain tying practices, which make the purchase of a product conditional on the purchase of 
another product, may have either pro-competitive or anti-competitive effects. In terms of negative effects, 
the main competition risks would be the foreclosure of the market to competing and potential suppliers or 
a  loss  of  in-store  inter-brand  competition.  Similarly,  the  increased  use  of  private  label  products  by 
retailers may lead to foreclosure of existing and potential competing suppliers. This could reduce the 
number of product items on the shelves, thereby limiting consumer choice.  
Exclusive supply agreements, which oblige the supplier to sell the goods specified in the agreement to one 
buyer only, can lead to a foreclosure of other buyers/retailers within the food supply chain. The market 16 
position of competing buyers on the upstream market is thus crucial since competitors are only likely to 
be foreclosed if their market position is significantly smaller than that of the buyer benefiting from the 
agreement. If the buyer has market power downstream, significant negative effects for consumers can be 
expected. However, countervailing power of suppliers is also of relevance, since important suppliers will 
not easily allow themselves to be cut off from alternative buyers. 
Certification schemes can be mentioned as an example of arrangements that could indirectly compel the 
suppliers to sell to only one buyer. These schemes may be useful for producers and consumers, as they 
guarantee quality and origin and therefore allow customers to make better informed choices. Nonetheless, 
the proliferation of schemes and labels in recent years has given rise to concerns about their transparency 
requirements,  the  credibility  of  the  claims  made  and  their  possible  effects  on  equitable  commercial 
relations.  In  particular,  the  pressure  to  participate  in  more  than  one  scheme  because  of  different 
requirements  entails  a  significant  financial  and  administrative  burden  for  agricultural  producers,  and 
especially small-scale producers. 
Mergers and acquisitions are a normal business process. They essentially imply a pooling of assets or a 
reallocation of corporate control, through which firms want to achieve certain strategic goals. Mergers 
can take place at horizontal or vertical level. The motivations behind mergers are very diverse, ranging 
from  efficiency  considerations  and  cost  savings  to  firm  expansion  or  market  access.  The  effects  of 
mergers are also very diverse and only anti-competitive mergers are being prohibited. Among the mergers 
with a so-called 'Community dimension' analysed by the European Commission since 2000 in sectors 
relating to the food supply chain, the large majority were unconditionally approved, indicating that they 
did  not  give  rise  to  impediments  to  competition.  Only  a  small  number  were  approved  subject  to 
conditions. This distribution is fairly consistent with merger decisions in other sectors of the economy, 
suggesting that mergers in sectors along the food supply chain do not a priori give rise to higher anti-
competitive risks than those in other sectors of the economy. 
6. Conclusion 
The sharp fluctuations in agricultural commodity and food prices at a time of great uncertainty about the 
economic outlook illustrate the need to improve the functioning of the European food supply chain with a 
view to enhancing its efficiency and competitiveness. The conclusions of the analysis presented in this 
paper  are  that  the  rapid  increase  in  food  prices  was  due  mainly  to  global  demand  and  supply 
developments. However, problems in the functioning of the food supply chain, in terms of competition 
and regulation, may have played an important role as well and there is room to improve the efficiency of 
the food supply chain. 
First, food price inflation differentials are a signal that the EU food market remains still fragmented. This 
fragmentation  can  be  due  to  differences  in  regulation  on  market  entry  and  pricing  and  to  business 
practices  such  as  exclusive  supply  agreements.  Second,  there  are  indications  of  differences  in  the 
conditions of competition across Member States. In particular, competitive pressures at the food retail 
level have absorbed some of the increase in producer prices in the euro area while this is not the case in 
the new Member States. Third, a consolidation is taking place throughout the food supply chain. This 
consolidation can lead to efficiency gains and hence to lower prices. However, it can also change the 
bargaining powers of actors in the different segments of the food supply chain and could deteriorate the 
competition conditions at the local level. 
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